A summary is presented of the efforts by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to determine which fishery-management measures are effective in conserving marine fisheries and in producing significant economic and social benefits, based on analyses of more than 100 fisheries in 24 OECD member countries. The evidence on management experiences is organized to focus on outcomes predominantly related to the resource, harvest, market, social, and administrative aspects of each fishery. The outcomes are correlated with management measures and characteristics of the fishery system to determine the conditions under which the measures conserve fishery resources and improve economic performance. Among the many findings reported are that the empirical evidence clearly shows that total allowable catch management results in a race-to-fish, with all its attendant effects; individual quotas are an effective means of controlling exploitation, of mitigating the race-to-fish and most of its attendant effects, of generating resource rent and increased profits, and of reducing the number of participants in a fishery. Also, it is clear that time and area closures have not been effective in assuring resource conservation, although conservation might well have been poorer without them.
Introduction
The efforts of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to determine which fishery-management measures are effective in conserving marine fisheries and producing significant economic and social benefits have resulted in the study Towards Sustainable Fisheries (OECD, 1997) , which presents the outcome of analyses of more than 100 fisheries. In all, 24 OECD member countries contributed to the study. National Reports on fishery-management experiences were prepared by Australia, Canada, the European Union and 13 of its member states (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom), Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United States.
The study derives conclusions about the conditions where, and explanations why, specific management measures are effective. It also attempts to identify fishery-management problems and issues in OECD member countries, and the institutional responses to these problems; how management institutions organized themselves internally; and how well the various management measures have performed in terms of solving fishery problems. Although the study considers the consequences of alternative management measures, it does not conclude which measures are best to use in practice. That is, the study shows which measures are most effective towards improving biological and economic performance, but other goals may be pursued by governments. Governments can use the results of the study to delineate the trade-offs among various objectives of fishery-management policies.
The study consists of three volumes: the synthesis report, national reports by member countries, and issues papers. The issues papers volume contains studies of co-management, by-catch and discards, the cost of unregulated fishing on the high seas, and the management of multi-species fisheries. The synthesis report describes fisheries and fishery management in OECD member countries, and analyses the consequences of fishery-management measures and institutional arrangements (local, national, and international) used in those member countries' fisheries.
A summary, drawn from the synthesis report, is presented and the findings are discussed. The evidence on management experiences is organized to focus on outcomes predominantly related to the resource, harvest, market, social, and administrative aspects of each fishery. The outcomes are correlated with management measures and characteristics of the fishery system to determine the conditions under which the measures conserve fishery resources and improve economic performance.
The need for fishery management Access to most marine fishery resources is ''open'' in the sense that no individual producer (fisherman) has the right to exclude other producers from harvesting (or otherwise using) any part of the resource. From an individual producer's perspective, leaving fish to grow and reproduce is done at the risk of losing the fish to other producers. Thus, there is no incentive to conserve the resource for future use, because no producer has exclusive use. The open access nature of marine fisheries is the fundamental cause of overexploitation in modern fisheries.
As producers do not have the ability to protect and conserve the resource for their own use, there is competition among them to catch fish before others do, driving the stock down below the optimum. The draw of perceived lower costs and greater net benefits (rather than actual) brings more producers to the fishery, and it induces each to apply more effort than is optimal for maximum economic performance of the fishery. The resulting economic performance in an open access fishery is inferior. The net benefits across all producers (and consumers) summed across all periods could be greater with lower levels of fishing effort. By lowering levels of effort, future net benefits to producers could increase and more than offset the reduction in current net benefits.
Under open access, competition to catch fish before other producers causes a ''race-to-fish'', resulting in fishing seasons that are shorter than optimal for maximum economic performance, landings that are too small and of inferior quality, and excessive investments in vessels and gear. Open access also leads to conflicts among user groups. As no producer has the right to exclude another from access to the resource, two or more producers can interact at the same time and place in a fishery, imposing external costs on each other in the form of gear or other losses. Mobile gear (such as trawls) may fish in the same area as fixed bottom gear (such as traps), causing damage to one or both of the gears. Large, efficient vessels can operate in a fishery on which small-scale producers are heavily dependent, draining the stock available for capture by the smaller producers. Failure to consider these external costs when deciding where and how to fish causes inferior economic performance in the fishery.
Processors, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers are also affected by the open access nature of a fishery. The race-to-fish can result in large quantities of fish being landed during short periods, requiring the build-up of excessively large processing, storage, and distribution facilities to handle the periodic peak loads. Wholesalers, retailers, and consumers find supplies of specific fish are abundant for short periods and scarce for long periods. Alternatively, the product is processed for long shelf life, generally reducing the quality of the products and price on the market.
Government regulations are needed to curtail the overexploitation of open access fisheries. Typically, governments implement fishery policy instruments (including management measures) with the goal of meeting social, economic, and/or biological objectives with respect to the use of living marine resources. In accordance with its perception of the structure of the fishery system, fishery managers decide to impose regulations on a fishery to control the system in order to influence the outcome in a direction that is considered desirable, given its objectives.
Study approach
The analytical framework used assumed that regulations imposed on fisheries affect the fisheries' performance. Performance is measured in terms of biological, economic, and social outcomes. Management measures, such as quotas, closed areas and seasons, and gear restrictions, tend to change the way fishing activities are conducted and, in turn, affect outcomes (stock sizes, landings, income, etc.) of the fishery. Actual outcomes, of course, are determined not only by the set of measures imposed but also by the biological, economic, social, and institutional characteristics of the fishery system (and perhaps by influences exogenous to the fishery system).
The methodology involved three steps. The first step developed a set of expected consequences (hypotheses) of using specific management measures in a fishery. The second step confronted these expectations with evidence to discern the extent to which each expected consequence is supported or refuted by the evidence. The third step assessed the theory on which policy is based and draws conclusions concerning the effects of using the measures for fishery management.
The management measures examined were divided into output controls, input controls, and technical measures (Table 1) . Output controls constrain the output (catch) of the fleet as a whole and/or the output of individual fishing units per trip and/or period of time. These measures included total allowable catch (TAC), individual quotas (IQs), and vessel catch limits. A TAC sets a maximum on the total catch allowed in the fishery for specific species, area, and time period. IQs restrict the catch of individual fishing units such that the sum of all individual quotas equals the TAC. Vessel catch limits restrict the amount a fishing unit can catch per trip or short period (such as a week), but they do not necessarily restrict the number of fishing units or number of fishing trips or periods.
Input controls constrain the inputs used to produce catch. These measures include limited licenses (which restrict the number of fishing units), individual effort quotas (which restrict the amount of gear in the water or amount of time gear spends in the water), and gear and vessel restrictions (which restrict the size and other dimensions of each fishing unit). An important feature of input controls is that the number of inputs to be controlled can be large, and the substitutability among inputs leads to difficulties in regulating.
Technical measures constrain the relationship between inputs and outputs (for individual fishing units or for the fleet as a whole). Size and sex selectivity measures restrict the size and sex of fish that can be taken and landed. Time and area closures limit the time and place where fishing units can operate.
Hypotheses
A set of expected consequences, or outcomes, from applying each management measure to a fishery were derived using bioeconomic theory. The expected consequences were loosely grouped according to resource, harvest, market, social, and administrative outcomes. The explanations of (or the reasons for) the expected consequences were based on the current state of general knowledge as reflected in the literature of fisheries science and economics.
The expected consequences were intended to apply to a reasonably general set of conditions, but are not expected to hold in all fisheries.* The fishery was assumed to possess the following characteristics: harvest of more than one species, more than one gear type, fresh and processed product markets, small-and large-scale harvesting units, perfect competition in the relevant markets, social and geographic heterogeneity. The premanagement fishery first was assumed to approximate unregulated open access. Then, the hypothesized effects were developed for each management measure as if applied in isolation to an unregulated open access fishery. Following this, the effects of the management measure in combination with other management measures were considered. In some cases there were pronounced changes in the expected consequences. However, in most cases, there were no qualitative changes in the stated hypotheses caused by combinations of management measures. Many of the hypotheses were derived from texts by Cunningham et al. (1985) and Anderson (1986) . More information can be found in Crutchfield (1961) , Scott (1979) , Clark (1980) , and Beddington and Retting (1984) .
The institutional setting for the post-management fishery (i.e. after a management measure or method is implemented) was assumed to involve varying degrees of user participation in the rule-making and implementation processes. The intent was to allow for a range of institutional arrangements where at one extreme a distant central authority dictates to producers the rules of harvest, and at the other extreme the rules are developed and implemented by the producers themselves. That is, the institutional setting may vary from that of a central planner, to sole owner or other forms of self-governance, co-management, collective management, or common property. Within this range of institutional arrangements, a single management authority or agency responsible for the management programme was assumed to exist. The authority may be local and community based, *As explained below, the performance of the measures is expected to depend on the characteristics of the fishery systems. That is, certain biological, economic, social, and institutional characteristics are expected to have a significant influence on the consequences of various management measures. 
Evidence
The second step involved confronting the expected consequences (hypotheses) with evidence on actual consequences in managed fisheries. The evidence used in the analysis is contained in management histories of selected fisheries in OECD member countries. Each management history for a specific fishery consists of a chronological description of the management measures applied and the corresponding outcomes (biological, economic, social, and administrative) observed in the fishery. The fisheries included were those for which a reasonable quantity of good quality information is available, and for which source documents were readily available. Principal sources of information are the 25 national reports prepared by the individual member country teams. Evidence on the specific consequences of fisherymanagement measures was divided into biological, economic, social, and administrative consequences. The principal biological consequence is the extent to which the target resource stock is protected from overexploitation. The principal economic consequence is the extent to which the fishery achieves its economic potential, as measured by the net economic benefits to harvesters, processors, distributors, marketers, and consumers. Social consequences involve effects on the distribution of income and wealth, the amount and form of employment, cohesion in rural communities, class divisions, and industry attitudes towards the regulation. Administrative consequences include enforcement costs and problems, catch data quality, monitoring and research requirements, and industry's support and cooperation.
The evidence concerning biological consequences describes changes in the abundance of fish stocks (as measured, for example, by catch-per-unit-effort, estimates of spawning stock biomass), and the composition of fish stocks (age and species composition).
Direct evidence on economic performance generally was not available. Therefore, the net economic benefits to harvesters, processors, distributors, marketers, and consumers was measured indirectly by examining changes in outcomes in the harvesting and marketing sectors of a fishery. Outcomes in the harvest sector include changes in landings (amounts and seasonal patterns); fishing patterns (season length, race-to-fish); harvesting capacity (fleet size and composition, vessel sizes); harvesting practices (fishing techniques, product handling); by-catch (amounts and use of); product utilization (discards, high-grading); landed product forms; harvesting costs; gear conflicts; gear loss; employment (amount and seasonal patterns) in harvesting and processing; safety; total sales/revenues; vessels owners and crew incomes; and resource rent. Outcomes in the market sector include changes in prices (levels and seasonal patterns); product quality and forms; product utilization; product availability patterns (e.g. market gluts and scarcity); imports and exports; and consumption patterns.
Social consequences include changes in ownership patterns (e.g. family, corporate); life-styles (e.g. rural, traditional); class divisions; and perceived inequities.
Administrative consequences include changes in the amount of monitoring resources and costs; research requirements and costs; enforcement resources and costs; enforcement problems; information demands; industry acceptance and cooperation, or resistance; and data degradation, including under-reporting of landings and fishing activity.
The evidence on management experiences in member countries was organized to focus on outcomes predominantly related to the resource, harvest, market, social, and administrative aspects of each fishery. To the extent that the evidence allowed, the goal was to correlate the outcomes with management measures and characteristics of the fishery system to determine the conditions under which the measures conserve fishery resources and improve economic performance.
No ranking of regulatory measures and consequences was made, because there may be several reasons for regulating a fishery. In addition to conserving the resource and improving economic performance of the fishery, management measures are used to prevent or mitigate conflicts among user groups, to affect the distribution of benefits among users, and to protect social values and life-styles. The results only delineate the inherent trade-offs among the sets of consequences when fishery managers are faced with deciding which management measures to employ.
The quality of the evidence is highly diverse, ranging from sound, scientifically produced data to anecdotal reports. All of the information used in the analysis was reviewed and revised, where necessary, by fisheries experts in the respective country. In addition, the interpretation of the information and conclusions drawn is tempered by the quality of the information.
Confronting the theory
The nature of the information available precluded use of formal statistical techniques to confront the expected consequences with evidence on actual consequences in managed fisheries. Instead, an informal, multi-layered procedure was applied. The first step in the process involved examining the evidence in each specific fishery for the time interval following implementation of a management measure, up to the time of a change in management measures. Whether the relevant expected consequence was supported or refuted by the evidence was noted. Then, alternative explanations of the reported outcomes were sought, and any credible alternative explanations noted.
Once the case-by-case confrontation was completed, the evidence was grouped by management measure, one set of evidence for each management measure. This aggregated evidence was examined for consistencies and inconsistencies with respect to the expected consequences. The numbers of cases that support or refute each specific expected consequence on management measures are reported. A high level of consistency (or inconsistency) allows one tentatively to not reject (or reject) any given expected consequence. In effect, univariate statistical analysis was conducted without use of formal statistical correlation methods. However, recognizing that univariate analysis is an insufficient basis for this exercise, the evidence is further examined for other influences, i.e. other causes of the observed outcomes.
Characteristics of the entire fishery system are expected to influence the operation of the fishery and the consequences of management measures, and they are accounted for to the extent the information allows. Four classes of characteristics were considered: biological, economic, social, and institutional.
Important biological characteristics include the number of species, the extent of biological interdependence (e.g. competition for food and habitat, predatorprey), mobility, growth and reproduction rates, and recruitment patterns (e.g. density-dependent, highly variable). Economic characteristics expected to influence the performance of management measures include the structure of the industry, types of gear, and the numbers of distinct user groups. Social characteristics expected to influence the consequences of management include kinship involvement, job satisfaction, education and training, age structure, community character, cultural and ethnic differences, and social cohesion. Institutional characteristics that may influence management consequences include the extent and nature of jurisdiction over the resource (local, national, international) , the extent of user involvement in the management process, structure of the management agency, and legal foundations.
Influences other than management measures and systems characteristics also were considered as evidence permits. A salient example of exogenous influences is a change in environmental conditions that can have major impacts on fisheries. Other examples include technological progress and market and trade developments. These and other exogenous influences can obscure the influence any one management measure has on outcomes in a fishery. Where possible, these and other explanations of the reported outcomes were investigated.
Findings: consequences of fishery-management measures
The consequences of the use of alternative measures to address fishery-management problems were analysed by comparing the expected and actual consequences of the measures in fisheries of OECD member countries. The results are summarized in Table 2 .
The review of theory and experience offers few definitive answers to the many pressing problems facing fishery management today. Most of the management measures are expected to provide some degree of conservation benefit in the form of maintaining or rebuilding resource stocks to desired levels. Unfortunately, in practice, none of the management measures assures resource conservation. The complexity of most fisheries appears to be one of the principal reasons for this poor performance.
Fisheries harvesting multiple species are expected to be more difficult and costly to manage than singlespecies fisheries. This expectation is supported in the evidence, with a high proportion of multi-species groundfish fisheries experiencing poor resource conservation and economic performance. In addition, relatively non-selective trawls are used in these fisheries, having high by-catch and discard rates, further weakening management's control on exploitation patterns (unless by-catch and discarded catch are monitored adequately and ITQs apply to all species). Multi-species fisheries complicate all aspects of fishery management. In multi-species fisheries where several species are caught jointly, no single management measure, or combination of measures, can achieve the optimal fishing mortality for all species. Almost any change in management measures will favour one species at the expense of another. Good conservation on all stocks appears non-feasible in such cases.
There is some consensus on the importance of accounting for multi-species interactions in fisheries analysis and management, but little has been accomplished to date. The theory for developing models to explain and analyse interactions is well developed. Biological and economic empirical evidence, however, is inadequate. Attempts to model multi-species fisheries in several countries are ongoing and are already providing information for the management process in some fisheries.
By-catch is inevitable in many multi-species fisheries. The quantities of by-catch and methods used to minimize its occurrence are determined by a variety of incentives and biological, social, economic, and regulatory constraints faced by fishermen. A fisherman will try to control by-catch as long as the benefits outweigh the costs to him. Effective management recognizes these constraints and also creates incentives to lessen the impact of by-catch.
Discarding is believed to be a major problem in many fisheries, even though the levels of discards are usually not well known. A recent FAO study (Alverson et al., 1994) provisionally estimated that global commercial discards amount to 27 million tonnes annually, i.e. 27% of the world catch.
There is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that substantial discarding at sea and underreporting of landings have increased since the implementation of ITQs. However, a recent study found no discernible increase in discards under an ITQ system compared to the previous limited effort management scheme. The increase in discarding in many ITQ-managed fisheries has been ascribed to the following factors: shortage of individual quotas; low-grade catch owing to damage, smallness, disease, or other features (i.e. low landing prices); by-catch which the vessel is not equipped to handle; and the presence of a multi-species fishery or mixed fisheries where issued TACs do not fit the composition of the catch. Some principles have been identified to counteract discarding, such as setting TACs by species such that different TACs can be filled approximately simultaneously; employing standard harvesting technologies; simple and well-advertised discard rules; flexible monitoring and surveillance designed to deal with the most pressing problems at each point in time; and addressing alleged violations quickly and effectively with penalties high enough to deter such practices.
Some fishery stocks that are highly variable may be particularly problematic for TAC and ITQ management. High year-to-year variance in natural mortality and recruitment may lead to stock failures even with conservative management, particularly for short-lived species. Interaction with other species may also affect fishery stocks independent of fishing pressure, or as a result of fishing pressure on other stocks. However, highly variable stocks are problematic for any and all management measures in terms of protecting the stocks from risk of collapse, etc.
Findings: consequences of institutional characteristics
The study also investigated the effects that selected institutional characteristics have on the tasks and outcomes of fishery management. Of particular interest was the relationship between fishery performance and how and which organizations carry out the main task of management. In particular, the study looked at the difference between allocating the responsibility for management (or part of it), on the one hand, to local non-governmental organizations and, on the other hand, to international intergovernmental organizations. These were compared with the most common institutional arrangements in OECD member countries, where the management responsibilities are Table 2 . Main results of analysing the success of fisheries-management resources.
Total allowable catch
Total allowable catch management results in a race-to-fish with all its attendant effects and generally has not effectively prevented over-exploitation of resources. Effects of over-capitalization, shortened seasons, market gluts, and increased harvesting and processing costs are particularly evident. Individual quotas Individual quotas are effective means of controlling exploitation, of mitigating the race-to-fish and most of its attendant effects, of generating resource rent and increased profits, and of reducing the number of participants in a fishery. Nevertheless, individual quotas present serious problems with initial allocation and with enforcement and compliance. There were several cases where quotas were consolidated, and rules were in place to limit consolidation. There is little evidence that smaller vessels are eliminated when individual quotas are introduced. Although enforcement costs frequently increase, ability and willingness of fishermen to pay these increased costs often increase.
Vessel catch limits
The only expected consequence that is strongly supported by the data is that vessel catch limits increase enforcement costs and problems. Limited licenses Limited licenses lead to over-capitalization and increased harvesting costs, but the evidence is confounded by the presence of total allowable catches in many of the reported cases. There is some support for the expected outcome of initial allocation problems, but the evidence is too sparse to draw a firm conclusion.
Individual effort quotas
There is some support for the expectation that individual effort quotas result in over-capitalization, increased harvesting costs, and increased enforcement problems.
Other gear and vessel restrictions
The evidence only weakly supports the expectations that such restrictions increase harvesting costs and reduce fleet size. Size and sex selectivity
Expectations that such measures do not mitigate the race-to-fish and result in increased enforcement costs and/or problems are supported. The evidence only weakly supports the expectations that average size of fish landed increases and that discarding decreases.
Time and area closures
Closures have not been effective in assuring resource conservation, although conservation might well have been poorer without. There is some evidence indicating that harvesting costs rise.
allocated to government organizations at the national level. At a local level, the study considered how co-management institutions influence the outcome of management measures and investigated which system characteristics favour successful co-management. At a national level, the question of how system characteristics influence the management tasks of control and enforcement as well as the outcome of management was addressed. Co-management at the national level also was examined.
At an international level the need for cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among countries was considered. International fishery-management organizations and their approaches to policy are described and consequences analysed in the report where such information is available (OECD, 1997).
Rights-based management
Another fundamental result emerging from fisherymanagement experiences of OECD member countries is that the route to rights-based management is usually circuitous. The best route between open access and rights-based management (such as individual transferable quotas) is not necessarily straight. Instead, the best (i.e. successful) route usually consists of incremental changes that effectively build upon one another.
A critical first step in the process is to establish a definite group of stakeholders. The next step is to develop an organization, or set of organizations, of stakeholders tasked with dealing with management issues. The third step is to codify the organization and to provide it with specific legal rights and responsibilities. All these measures act to provide stakeholders a modest degree of secure tenure in the resource. With secure tenure, the stakeholders are subject to powerful incentives to control their exploitation of the resource.
The group of stakeholders needs not be fixed, nor must the individuals be specifically identified. The stakeholder organization would have conditions for membership, and, as far as management is concerned, the organization would be subject to satisfying specific standards of resource conservation, environmental protection, use rights, etc. Organizations of fishermen, based on port or community or gear type, ultimately may be superior management mechanisms. Current trends are moving in this direction.
The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have devolved fishing rights and responsibilities to producers. Those countries have found that the co-management approach reduces administrative costs and greatly improves compliance with management regulations. Japan has built on its lengthy tradition of rights-based management and now has the world's most extensive and sophisticated fisheries co-management system. Other countries have much to learn from these experiences.
There are several attributes that appear to contribute to the success of IQ and ITQ management. Fisheries with a limited number and well-defined group of participants are more easily brought under and managed with ITQs. Fisheries that were under limited entry or had a very small number of participants provide a well-defined user group, and initial allocations are made easier. The quota-holders have already developed a sense of property in the fishery in many cases that contributes to acceptance of individual quotas and, at least in some cases, may contribute to improved compliance and collaboration with enforcement. Fisheries with a homogeneous fleet are more easily put under ITQs. Allocations are more easily decided and the fishery typically has less adjustment to go through.
User participation in the development and implementation of fishery-management plans is a critical element for successful management. Co-management arrangements are one of the more promising avenues for greater user participation, but there are several remaining questions about co-management. How, for example, should co-management be implemented? What rights and responsibilities should remain with government and which with users? Is more user participation better than less in all fisheries? Is user participation feasible and desirable in the cases of straddling stocks and highly migratory species? If producers' organizations are needed for co-management, how can and should fishermen be organized, especially when they have no history of organization?
The study (OECD, 1997) represents one of the few, if not the only, attempts to comprehensively assess the performance of the full suite of management measures. The study found considerable evidence, and excellent scholarly studies of individual quotas, limited licenses and TAC measures. However, there is great paucity of evidence on the performance of the other management measures (size and sex selectivity, closures, effort quotas, vessel catch limits, and gear and vessel restrictions; cf. summary in Table 2 ). These other measures will continue to be widely employed in fishery management. While the theory of how these measures are supposed to work is well developed, the supporting empirical evidence is missing. The actual application of these methods appears to be conducted more on faith than on a sound factual basis.
